Ia Drang 1965: The Struggle for Vietnam’s Pleiku Province (Campaign)

Once again, Professor J. P. Harris has written outstanding book about the Vietnam War in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. I read his first book, Vietnam's High Grounds, and was taken by the rich prose, robust research, and cogent analysis in that book, so I was most eager to read his latest contribution to the history of the war. I was not disappointed. His latest effort is again a richly researched and highly informative and entertaining work. As a history professor at the Royal Military Academy in the United Kingdom, Prof. Harris brings the keen insight of a seasoned and accomplished historian to a battle that was both strategically important and tactically illustrative. The book is also superior to many books that involve important battles in that it has an abundant number of photos and maps that give the reader a full understanding of the event, how it was conducted at various stages, and the main participants who determined its outcome. What I found most impressive is the unbiased presentation of the facts and analysis based upon those facts, with no hidden agenda or political axe to grind. Prof. Harris uses American, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese sources to bring into sharp focus every aspect of the battle. As a professional military officer, I recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Vietnam War, air mobility operations, American and North Vietnamese strategy and tactics, and military history in general. It is military history at its best.

A 1965 North Vietnamese thrust into South Vietnam's Pleiku Province coincided with the deployment of the U.S. Army's first airmobile division. The ensuing confrontation between the First Cavalry Division and the North Vietnamese has become the stuff of legend, immortalized by the book "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young" and a subsequent movie. With the advantage of perspective, authors J.P. Harris and J. Kenneth Eward take a hard look at the fighting in the Ia Drang valley.The opening third of the book introduces the reader to the two sides and their respective forces, commanders, and plans. The heart of the narrative is the actual fighting in Pleiku Province, beginning with the siege of the Special Forces camp at Plei Me and culminating with tense and bloody combats at LZ's X-Ray and Albany on the edge of the Chu Pong Massif. The delivery is remarkably evenhanded, comparing North Vietnamese and U.S./South Vietnamese perceptions of and reactions to events. The text is very well supported by maps, battle diagrams, illustrations and period photographs. The author's conclusions are harsh but fair. Well recommended to students of the conflict and the general reader looking for a concise account.

Of course this book covers the bloody campaign in the Ia Drang valley in an overview fashion, but it also covers a lot of critical detail about US and NVA tactics and overall goals. This is not a "take you into the individual soldier's mind during combat" kind of a book. It is a good overview of the why and where and who of the Ia Drang valley action and its outcome and its impact on the overall war effort.AD2

J. P. Harris, a meticulous researcher and talented storyteller, is one of the premier military historians of our time. "Ia Drang" sets the historical record straight on just what happened in Western Pleiku Province in fall 1965, when the U.S. and PAVN armies clashed for the first time in what would become a very long and costly war. Harris's attention to archival documents from both sides provides clear insight into the thinking of both U.S. and North Vietnamese commanders and strategists. The book is well-appointed with detailed and clear maps, as well, and is stocked with compelling photos and illustrations. Harris, co-author Kenneth Eward, and illustrator Edouard Groult have put together a tight, deeply researched, and visually compelling history of the first major conventional clashes of the Vietnam War. Highly recommended!

As a participant (Plei Me Oct.1965),I was surprised at how much occurred that I was unaware of. This is a synthesis and critique of the Ia Drang Campaign.

This is a very interesting book on the battle just how we got there how we fought and the after results..great buy

I have two shelves of them.

True story.

Well-written by a 30-year professor at Sandhurst, this is a worthy addition to any collection of military history and, together with its many associated Osprey publications: Tet Offensive; MACVSOG; Green Berets etc., will form part of a comprehensive study of the Vietnam War.I deducted a star, as it is slightly muddled as concerns map placement, the overview of all operations in the Ia Drang Valley area only appearing right at the back, and IMHO the artwork leaves a little to be desired - not the crisp, clear drawings I am used to and a bit lacking in detail. In fact, I think I could have done better pictures myself! These relatively minor issues notwithstanding, it is still highly recommended.

Although the vast majority of the campaign series cannot be faulted for overall content a certain number are,quite frankly,a boring read.This edition proceeds at a cracking pace and held my attention from start to finish(unusualy,for the campaign series,I read this one in one mammoth sitting )The authors give objective and balanced opinions and even if you are not especially interested in the Vietnam conflict I highly recommend this edition for the quality of the writing.

all good. thank you.

A tense and gripping story of a US Army battalion of around 650 men locked in battle with 3 regiments of the North Vietnamese Army

This is a self-published book by a God-loving Republican helicopter pilot who blames pacifists and Satan in equal measure for the US defeat in the Vietnam war. He writes: “Satan hates mankind because God created us all. He is the source of evil and he works through the weakness of our flesh to carry it out. He is the only winner in the saga of Vietnam”.He believes that “Democrat congressman [used] the war as a basis for political victory” and that they cut off funding in 1975 which insured the defeat of South Vietnam. Walter Cronkite and John Kerry were marked for special mention as unpatriotic Americans. Overall, the book is not well-researched, full of a prejudiced point of view. The author also seems to be hampered by lack of access to the top decision-making echelons of the military and political arena, further ensuring this book to be stuck at a shallow level of analysis – or even factual accounts of events.