Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45

The hardcover edition of this book was published in 1965, with an author's forward for the reprinted version in 1985. Despite the archival resources that the author didn't have access to in 1965, his research efforts and literary skills bring Operation Barbarossa to life. The description that the author provides on the relationships between Hitler and his generals contributes to the doom that befell the Germans during a campaign that was massive in scale and depth. The euphoria that spellbound the German army after their successful invasions of Poland and France would not apply to the war on the Eastern Front. We learn about the resentment and maneuvering that occurred within the German High Command and the inner circle of Adolf Hitler. Even before the invasion of Russia, the mistrust that plagued the command structure of the German army played out in power struggles that contributed to the demise of Barbarossa. The author accesses the map rooms of Adolf Hitler and we witness the slow mental and physical decline of the leader who said that the "world will hold its breath" when the German army invaded Russia. We see the mistakes that German leadership made prior to the invasion: 1) underestimating Red Army forces; 2) difficulties with logistics and supplies; 3) a limited understanding of history on the part of Adolf Hitler; 4) poor intelligence concerning Russia strength; 5) a lack of winter clothing; 5) wider gauged railroad tracks in Russia than in Germany; 6) Hitler's claim that just kicking in the door will cause the" entire rotten structure of Russia to come crashing down." The German Army was confronted by an opponent of a completely different kind from those in the West; it failed to appreciate that the Russian soldier "loves a fight and scorns death." This information sets the stage before German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. The early days of the invasion resemble those of Poland and France, but the German Army quickly learns that the resistance of the Russian soldier is so intense that some believe they have killed the same man twice. The summer successes that the German Army experiences with victories at Mink and Smolensk contribute to the false belief that the campaign will end in months. The intoxicating momentum that drives the German Army comes to a grinding halt when Hitler decided to attack Leningrad and Kiev instead of Moscow. His decision to divide the strength of Army Group Center - and postpone a full assault on Moscow before the rains and winter set in - does not bode well for the German Army. If you like World War Two history, please consider having this book on your shelf. The details that it provides on Operation Typhoon (the Batlle of Moscow) as well as the deathtrap of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk will not disappoint. You will be introduced to Guderian and Manstein on the German side and to Zhukov, Chuikov, and Timoshenko on the Russian side. The last chapter concerns the final, ill-fated efforts that the German Army made to slow the Russian forces that head to Berlin. This book provides the foundation and inspiration for other authors to write about a very important part of miliaty history.

There has been a lot of scholarship since this was first published in 1965 (updated in the mid-70s I think), but this still stands the test of time and is probably the most readable account available. Glantz goes way way too deep, and other authors base themselves on new interpretations (Stahel) — all good and very worthwhile — but I keep coming back to Clark for the clarity and coherence of the story. Clark, like most, glosses over the underlying evil that marked the purpose of the campaign, and the sidesteps the unpardonable conduct (holocaust, prisoners, reprisals) and the absolute complicity of the senior officers who claimed no knowledge. But that is par for most eastern campaign narratives, and only a few authors have heroically tackled those issues.

Several questions surround Operation Barbarossa - why did Germany attack in 1941, did they ever have a chance to win, when was the turning point and what was the number one reason they lost. These questions are still being debated to this day because the Eastern Front in WW 2 will forever hold our attention as one of the most thrilling yet tragic stories in world history. In fact the Western Front in WW 2, though more thorougly covered, is just a side show to the cataclysm on the Eastern Front. Alan Clark's book does a great job at examining these questions as well as bringing multiple parts of the drama to life. He paints with a journalistic vigor and - shockingly - is relatively unbiased. Unfortunately, this book was written so long ago that he did not even know that Martin Bormann died in 1945 (his remains were found in the early 1970s). This means that a lot of material now known to the West was unavailable to Clark at the time of writing but it also means that he had access to many living actors at the time. The book is also lacking in maps so some of the narrative is hard to follow unless you are intimately acquainted with European geography at a local level. Finally, this is not a comprehensive narrative: Clark chooses only to focus on major events such as the Moscow front in 1941, Stalingrad, the Kursk salient, and the final dark days of Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, Clark does a wonderful job with the key battles and explains well the political, technological, and tactical developments. So what about those questions? It appears Germany chose the right year to attack because the Soviet Union was ill prepared for the onslaught and was in disarray with the recent Stalin purges. They probably should have attacked earlier than June 22, however. Had they attacked in 1942 or 1943 it is quite possible they would have been defeated even quicker. But - again - why attack? This was the plan from the beginning. It was never a question of if but when. The Nazis saw themselves as saviors of Western Civilization and that included a crusade against Bolshevism. They felt that England was isolated and that Japan would keep the USA busy so concerns about a two-front war did not override the desire to attack at that point. Did they ever have a chance to win? This is very debateable but it appears they certainly did but the window of opportunity closed quickly. What was the turning point where that window closed? Was it the winter debacle outside of Moscow 1941? The failure to subjugate Leningrad and let loose Army Group North (which was pinned for 4 years)? The most favorite choice of course is Stalinggrad and it is hard to argue against it but did Germany not still have a chance in the summer of 1943 when they chose - unwisely - to attack a superior Russian defense at the Kursk salient? I am on the fence as to what was the turning point but I am not convinced it is StalingGrad, as devestating as it was. Germany still had a chance in 1943 but they threw it away. I tend to think that Guderian's plans, which Hitler ignored, could have worked for 1943-1944. What was the ultimate reason for Germany's loss? First the Russians deserve a lot of credit for their indomitable spirit, bravery, perserverance, and industriousness. There was a whole litany of strategic failures for the Germans - the Nazi ideology which alienated potential, natural allies like the Ukranians; the failure to coordinate with Japan; the reliance on weak allies like Italy and Romania; the internal dissensions; the meddling from Hitler; the lack of focus for Army Group South; the poor spy network, the arrogance of assumed Teutonic superiority that constantly underestimated their enemy, and the failure to appreciate the Russian environment and poor road system. Even the overcomplicated nature of their tanks compared to the simplicity of the Russian T-32 was a factor.

I love this book. Others have done a fantastic job of describing its pros and its cons (yes, there are a few flaws). But the reason I consider this book to be THE DEFINITIVE WORK on the Eastern Front during WWII is because Alan Clark, a Western historian, boldly declared in 1964, in the middle of the Cold War, the following (hereafter an excerpt from Clark's Preface, p. xxi): "From this study is one left with any general conclusions? I believe the answer is yes, but they are not of a kind from which we in the West can derive much comfort. It does seem that the Russians could have won the war on their own, or at least fought the Germans to a standstill, without any help from the West. Such relief as they derived from our participation - the distraction of a few enemy units, the supply of a large quantity of material - was marginal, not critical. That is to say, it affected the duration but not the outcome of the struggle. It is true that once the Allies had landed in Normandy the drawing-off of reserves assumed critical proportions. But the threat, much less the reality, of a 'second front' became a factor only after the real crisis in the East had passed." Writing this in 1964 took a lot of courage. And it speaks to why this book is such a worthy read for anyone studying World War Two - the author obviously has made sincere and fervent attempts to speak the truth as much as he could perceive it, which in the final analysis is the duty of all true historians.

Barbarossa, (1966) by Alan Clark (later Secretary of State for Margaret Thatcher), tells the story of what has been and likely will remain by far the largest land war in history, the Eastern Front of WWII. Intending to exterminate or enslave the Eastern populations , to appropriate for themselves their resources and "living space" , the Nazis invaded, but ultimately were vanquished by, the Russians. From June 1941 until VE day, millions of men, and tens of thousands of tanks, planes and artillery on opposing sides of a line of over a thousand miles, make laughable Time Magazine's naming Dwight Eisenhower (great and wise as he was), "The Man Who Won the War". Among various reflections: Writing at the height of the Cold War, Clark, like many on the Right, excoriated Roosevelt for his sacrificing Eastern Europe to the Soviets at Yalta. But, from today's perspective, Roosevelt's wisdom shines clearly through. Compared to our small European force, the Soviets already had over ten times the men and divisions occupying those vast territories. Churchill's campaign to head off the Soviet advance by striking northward through the Balkans was roundly rejected by his own military. The outcome of an American attempt to continue the war Eastward and displace the Russians most likely would have been our decimation and Soviet tanks on the English Channel. As bad as it was for those nations to be under the heel of the Soviets for forty-five years, today they are free. Another irony: Until the very end, the Nazi leadership (excluding Hitler) hoped to persuade the advancing British and Americans to join them, and "defend Western Civilization" against "the Bolshevik menace". Regarding the significance of their own depredations, they lacked insight, and deluded themselves from taking seriously Roosevelt's demand for "unconditional surrender". [email protected]

Fantastic, one of the best book on the German-Soviet War 1941-45, a part of World War II that doesn't get enough attention in Western Europe of the U.S. Americans have not been taught about how truly titanic and brutal that part of WW2 actually was. Stalingrad, Kursk, Ukraine, Sebastopol, the Siege of Leningrad and of course the Battle of Berlin, where Russia took 500,000 casualties.

I consider myself reasonably well read on the Eastern Front... this book has a unique perspective in the evaluation of personalities and circumstances affecting the Eastern Front war from beginning to end. A careful study is made of the events leading to the war, the conduct of it and the effect of many decisions. Old Man Winter does not get the simple credit for the defeat of the German Army, and the three separate major defeats of the German Army (Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk) are examined in relation to the surrounding battles, the decisions impacting each defeat, and the effect personalities played in those consequences. I recommend it.

Wonderfully written and full of insights contrary to the conventional wisdom - that it was Hitler's refusal to retreat after his defeat before Moscow in winter 1941 that saved the German Army from the fate suffered by Napoleon 150 years before; that Hitler's refusal to allow the 6th Army to withdraw from Stalingrad was essential in saving the Germans from and even bigger disaster, the loss of all their forces in southern Russia; that the single most important reason the German Army failed to defeat Russia in 1941 was the primitive nature of the Soviet road system. If Russia had roads comparable to France, Hitler would have been in Moscow by September 1941. A must read for anyone interested in the story of history's most cataclysmic military campaign.

eerrer

This book has been favourably reviewed many times here so I won't add detailed comments. This is the second time I have read the work and I can hardly fault it (yet I shall). Even though one knows the ending it reads like a novel one cannot put down; Clark engages his reader very well indeed. Clark, sensibly, does not regard Hitler as a mindless monster as of the "Black lagoon": he recognizes Hitler's personal bravery and his brilliance. Indeed, he partially exonerates Hitler of blame for military cock-ups which were attributed to the Fuehrer post hoc in the memoires of German generals. The story is a tradegy for the Russians, ultimately more so for the Germans, and for the many hapless others caught up in a conflict imbued with crazy racial doctrines. Which leading character comes out best from Clark's account: Hitler or Stalin? It's a toss up really. Stalin had no compunction about starving peasants or culling his military leadership in purges. Hitler, for the most part, did not persecute those he regarded as his own countrymen yet he was merciless to those deemed racially inferior (which included some of his own countrymen). The only reservation I have of this work is the quality of the maps. Clark frequently refers to locations that are not on his maps. To get the best out of this book one needs to refer to a war atlas of Russia at that time.

came safely with no damage. thanks to amazon. The book covers all aspects of Operation Barbarossa in a quite comprehensively manner. one of the best books for understanding the art of war and war strategy Highly recommended. special for the defence officer

Being aware that this book is no 30/40 years old, I decided to read Alan Clark's work on this atrocious conflict that involved two of the most powerful war machines of this century. The book has good reviews and offers a perfect overview to the gigantic subject. The narration is fluid and the chapter division quite helpful. More importantly, the author keeps away from overdescription of unit positions, movements of troops, etc. which can blur the vision sometimes. This is especially true for a campaign like Barbarossa. Its is quite often that military history authors lacking politic and economic knowledge prefers to concentrate on purely militaristic matters. However, I had a really good time reading the book but was quite dissapointed and would say frustrated that the book was very light on: - The Leningrad siege - The battle for Berlin - The role of the luftwaffe and the war in the air Despite the above, there are some really brillant parts such as the Stalingrad chapters, or the addition of recorded dialogues between Hitler and his staff, or personal accounts such as the 2 ou 3 pages long account of the russian sniper. Finally, I recomend the reading of Guderian's book "Panzer Leader" which presents the conflict through the eye of the famous tank theorist and leader.

All details about the German campaign, well presented and easy to understand. The book came safely with no damage. The book covers all aspects of Operation Barbarossa quite comprehensively. Highly recommended.