From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902–1914 (Volume 35) (Campaigns and Commanders Series)

I have an abiding interest in balanced and well-researched topics for the World War One period. This subject has been discussed before by primarily British authors examining the BEF's performance in 1914. In my opinion, Jones has raised the bar with this volume. He notes several interesting subjects that I have not read about before, namely that the Boer War had varying effects on all of the arms of service. Most readers somewhat familiar with the subject know that British infantry units benefited by virtue of their excellent use of ground, khaki uniforms (in sharp contrast to their French allies) and level headed small unit tactics which did not place offensive tactics above all else.However, the author also goes into detail on the impact of the Boer War on British cavalry and artillery, which I have not read about before. The Boer use of long-range artillery resulted in the British not being able to respond effectively for much of the conflict in South Africa. As a result, the British Army invested significant funding into modernizing their field artillery. In addition, the British had found that howitzers were needed to shell Boer trenches in order to providing covering fire for their advancing infantry up until the last minute. As a result, the British fielded a much larger number of howitzers per divisions than did their French allies. One reason that the British did not have more machineguns in their infantry units, for example, was because they spent so much on modernizing their artillery.British cavalry, rather than being equipped with short carbines and metal breastplates, were armed with rifles capable of engaging their German opponents at much longer ranges. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on your sympathies, the British cavalry did defeat the Boers using classic cavalry tactics on one or two occasions, which dampened much enthusiasm within their ranks for making significant changes in the post-war period.Not all of the experiences of the Boer War were utilized efficiently as very different experiences of the Russo-Japanese War, coupled with significant turnover within the ranks of the British Army in the decade plus served to dilute some of the lessons learned at such a cost in blood in South Africa.However, the very nature of the fighting in South Africa also worked against the British who were opposed, in large part by irregular mounted infantry who operated in relatively small units and lacked significant numbers of artillery tubes. As a result, there were lessons that were not "learned" as British divisions and corps were not schooled on the field in battle in how to operate against similarly organized and equipped armies - which is what they experienced in 1914. The Boers were never in a position to threaten a British division or corps with destruction, but the Germans were capable of doing so and almost accomplished that feat.Nor did I realize that the British ranks at Mons and Le Cateau were NOT composed of "old soldiers who had fought in many a colonial battle" as the author points out that the veterans of the Boer War were very few in number in the enlisted ranks - primarily because most of the British and Commonwealth soldiers who fought in that battle were volunteers who flocked to the colors after the initial ignominious defeats suffered in South Africa. That said, the "open order" infantry formations that the British had to adopt in South Africa gave rise to the professional NCO - in the modern sense- in the British Army following the Boer War.Jones' arguments are not without merit. If the British Expeditionary Force had been afflicted by the same tactical shortcomings that the French and Russians displayed in 1914, I doubt it would have survived its first major engagement.The book, however, will not satisfy readers seeking a comprehensive account of battles in either the Boer War or 1914. Specific incidents that bolster the authors "arguments" are frequently introduced, but the book - as its title suggests - concentrates on the impact on certain engagements on doctrine, equipment, and training.Jones' writing style is as impressive as his research and analysis. The author does not attempt to bury readers with facts, though not all may not find his writing style as enjoyable as I did.

This time frame was important for the British army. The Boer war opened the eyes of the British army that it needed to change from tactics that worked in colonial battles and needed to adapt to modern warfare. By WW1 some the lessons had been forgotten.

Sir James Edmonds (Official Historian for the British Army's 1914-1919 volumes), famously remarked that the British Expeditionary Force of 1914 was the best army Britain ever put into the field. Was he right? Are the tales of the Regular's legendary musketry exaggerated or complimentary to more significant changes made during the Edwardian military reforms?From Boer War to World War bridges a significant gap in both World War I and Anglo-Boer War history and military history at large. Concise and focused, the author concentrates on the Boer War's implications on British tactical, technical, and doctrinal development. Whilst the Germans and French used their 1870-71 lessons and the world witnessed the Russo Japanese 1904 and Balkan Wars 1912-13, Britain was able to grapple with a European foe in both conventional and unconventional warfare. The book highlights the importance of both stages on debates within the British army high command.Doctrine, ethos, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and historiography are provided in succinct chapters which one can pause to digest. In accessible language and with plenty of archival research, the book is useful to amateur and expert alike. Expect excellent images of Boer artillery, British snap shooting, and the development of skirmish formations.Jones also presents a balanced case and does not shy from the deficiencies in inter-service learning for combined arms evolution, the problem of dissemination and the army's pre-war financial struggles to complete everything it sought to do. Machine guns, musketry, siege warfare, dismounted fighting, operational code, and a plethora of other topics span the scope of the book to give the reader understanding as to why Edmonds arrived at his conclusion of the 1914 Regulars.From Boer War to World War also covers a gap of British military history. I wanted to know more than the myths about the mad minute and how tactical doctrine was propagated throughout the army before and during the creation of the Chief of Staff. Stephen Badsey took on cavalry reform and Ian Beckett examined generalship and ethos in the late Victorian era, but this is the first synthesis that takes a look at why the BEF of 1914 was able to survive its clashes and act as a functioning part of the French Army's northern left without centralisation from GHQ during very critical moments.

Jones writes a thoughtful and comprehensive study of the critical mistakes that were made by the British (and also European) military establishment following the conclusion of the Boer War in 1902. For example, Jones does a masterful job explicating the military elite's unrelenting reliance on the frontal advance notwithstanding the lack of efficacy of that approach following the shift in technology (Maxim's machine gun, smokeless powder, log range, high velocity bullets and magazine-fed carbines. Rather than adjust doctrine to fit the changing landscape of battlefield tactics, the British ethos of offensive power and aggression prevailed ("victory is actually won by the bayonet, it settles the point"). Anyone interested in the lessons learned (or ignored) following decisive shifts in the nature of warfare would be well served to consider the fine analysis brought to the subject by Jones.

I’m really impressed by this book. The author does a fantastic job explaining the topic in terms that I can understand. I have enjoyed learning about this subject.